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Golden: Secondary Recovery Operations - Protection of Correlative Rights

COMMENTS
SECONDARY RECOVERY OPERATIONSPROTECTION OF CORRELATIVE RIGHTS
[N]o man's property can be taken, directly or indirectly, without compensation ....

Even the sover-

eign must pay for what it takes or damages for the
public good, and it cannot absolve a private party
from the same duty.'
Extensive periodical literature,' and increasing state
conservation legislation are evidence of the wide-spread attention now being directed toward the field of secondary recovery and pressure maintenance operations. Even with such
progress in this area of oil and gas law, problems still exist
which impede the complete utilization of secondary recovery
programs. One such problem has arisen from the recent case
of Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson' and involves the possibility
of unit operators being held liable in damages for invasion
of injected substances into the stratum of adjacent, nonunitized property. It is the contention of this paper that
authorization for the injection given by state conservation
agencies should not immunize the unit operator from paying
damages for the injury he may cause within the exercise of
the power authorized, viz., the police power. The protection
of correlative rights demands reparation for such adverse
effects. Not to allow recovery in damages in these situations
would raise serious due process questions. Therein lies the
heart of this article.
1.

Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 163 (10th Cir. 1963); 17
0. & G.R. 282 (1963) ; 18 0. & G.R. 982 (1963).
2. See generally, Bowen, Secondary Recovery Operations-Their Values and
Their Legal Problems, 13th OIL & GAS INqT. 331 (Sw. LEGAL FDN. 1962);
Brown & Myers, Some Legal Aspects of Water Flooding, 24 TEXAS L. REv.
456 (1946); Driscoll, Secondary Recovery of Oil and Gas: Significance of
Agency Approval, 13 KAN. L. REV. 481 (1965); Franks, Rights of Consenting and Non-Consenting Owners Under Secondary Recovery and
Pressure Maintenance Operations, 16th OIL & GAS INST. 343 (Sw. LEGAL
FDN. 1965); Jones, Tort Liabilities in Secondary Recovery Operations, 6
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 639 (1961); Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the
Oil and Gas Industry 11, 39 TEXAS L. REV. 253 (1961); Kelley, Trespass in
Secondary Recovery, 17 Sw. L.J. 591 (1963); Methvin, Secondary Recovery
Operations: Rights of the Non-Joiner, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 364 (1964);
Smith, Rights and Liabilitieson Sub-surface Operations,8th OIL & GAS INST.
1 (SW. LEGAL FDN. 1957); Walker, Problems Incident to the Acquisition,
Use, and Disposal of Repressuring Substances Used in Secondary Recovery
Operations, 6 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 273 (1961); Williams, Compulsory
Pooling and Unitization (Of Oil and Gas Rights), 15th OIL & GAS INST. 223
SSW. LEGAL FDN. 1964); Comment, Oil and Gas: Rights and Liabilities
Incident to Water Flood Operations, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 457 (1964).
8. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, supra note 1.
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At the outset, a metes and bounds description of the
topics to be explored is in order. To lend itself to a workable
scheme, this article is broadly divided into sectors of voluntary unitization on the one hanfd and compulsory unitization
on the other. Secondary recovery operations in general, including the purposes for which such programs are conducted,
the types of operations which are authorized, and the possible
injuries which may result from these operations will be
treated in the brief first segment of this paper. Upon proper
construction of this foundation, the latter part of the article
will consider in depth the liability vel non of the injecting
party to the non-assenting interest owner. This latter treatment includes, first, an elimination of certain collateral issues
that arise in connection with the principal area under consideration and, second, a development of the remedies available to the non-joiner under each of the two types of unitization.
SECONDARY RECOVERY IN GENERAL

When pressure in an oil and gas reservoir falls below
that needed to yield oil in paying quantities, it is often practicable and necessary to employ secondary recovery measures
to realize maximum production. To obtain this desired result
the principal method employed is repressuring by water
flooding or gas injection, which has been defined as "the
deliberate, controlled injection of water into an oil-producing
stratum for the purpose of increasing the percentage and
rate of recovery of oil from the stratum."' Thus, the secondary recovery method secures recovery through increase
in reservoir energy by the injection of liquids or gases into
the reservoir after the original reservoir energy has been
depleted, and usually, but not always, after the primary recovery period has terminated.5 Substances injected into this.
underground structure may migrate to a portion of the reservoir underlying the land of another and, in the course of
such migration, displace oil or gas underlying such adjoining
land. It is this substance migration and the consequent ad4. Brown & Myers, Some Legal Aspects of Water Flooding, 24 TEXAS L. REV.
456 (1946).
5. Ibid.
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verse effects therefrom upon the non-unitized landowner's
interest which gives rise to the principal problem with which
this paper is concerned, viz., striking a balance between the
protection of a non-joining landowner's correlative rights
in the substances underlying his land in their natural state
and of preserving to the unit operator the fruits of his industry in producing from a common source of supply.
Initially, it must be recognized there are several factors
that create state conservation legislation, the purpose of
which is to provide broad boundary lines within which secondary recovery measures may be conducted for the benefit
of all parties concerned. First, it must be noted that initiation of such operations is more likely than primary operations
to result in violation of the correlative rights of other owners
in the common source of supply.' Secondly, oil and gas have
been regarded as natural resources in every state where discovered; and their production, storing, and transportation
are affected with a public interest. This public interest is
founded upon the fact that these minerals are irreplaceable,
constitute an important source of revenue, and are of great
benefit to individuals and industry.! Because of these factors, i.e., protection of correlative rights and recognition of
the public interest, each state where there is substantial production has enacted laws authorizing its conservation agency
to make rules and regulations governing secondary recovery
operations.
Such legislation employs the two types of secondary
programs toward which the attention of this article is directed. One project type may be instituted by some or all of the
lessees or lessors under a unitization agreement that may or
may not have government non-compulsory approval. This
type is designated as voluntary unitization. What is termed
as compulsory unitization is created upon contractual unitization of interests, by a substantial majority in interest, of
6. Franks, Rights of Consenting and Non-Consenting Owners Under Secondary
Recovery and Pressure Maintenance Operations, 16th OIL & GAS INST. 343,
367 (Sw. LEGAL FDN. 1965).
7. Id. at 382. See, A.B.A. SECT. M. & N.R.L., PIOCEEDINGS 41 (1962): "Currently, one third of the oil produced in the United States comes from
secondary recovery projects, 16.3 billion barrels are economically recoverable
utilizing current secondary recovery techniques, and new methods may
add an additional 40.2 billion barrels."
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the lessees and lessors within the proposed boundary of the
project with conversion by an order of the state conservation
agency to a compulsory project binding upon all interests
within the plan. Both types of program may cover either
all or part of a field. As provided by these statutes and the
regulations promulgated thereunder by the authorizing state
agency, the purposes for which unitization may be voluntarily
agreed upon or compulsorily ordered are stated in general
terms to promote flexibility and include prevention of waste,
avoidance of the drilling of unnecessary wells, increasing
ultimate recovery, and protection of correlative rights.'
Of the possible injuries which may be sustained from
a secondary recovery operation, the greatest harm occurring
is damage to the sub-surface, since this is the most difficult
to control. This sub-surface damage appears in a variety of
forms, the most common of which are (1) shoving oil across
lease lines, whether from leases involved in the project or
from offset leases not involved in the project; (2) flooding
offset producing wells still engaged in primary recovery;
(3) causing expense to be incurred by the offset producer
in protecting himself against the adverse effects of the flooding; and (4) production lost as a result of being by-passed
or "watered off" the reservoir by the injected repressuring
substance.' Keeping in mind these possible injuries and
noting that most secondary recovery operations are conducted
under voluntary or compulsory unit agreements rather than
by an individual operator upon his own leasehold, the discussion now turns to a consideration of the liability for injuries resulting from such operations.
8. 6 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 913.1 (1964). An example is
the provision in the Alaska statute, ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.110 (a) (1962)
To prevent, or to assist in preventing waste, to insure a greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas, and to protect the correlative
rights of persons owning interests in the tracts of land affected,
these persons may validly integrate their interests to provide for
the unitized management, development, and operation of such tracts
of land as a unit ....
While the Montana Conservation Act, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 60-131
(1947), is unique in its failure to mention the protection of correlative rights,
the obligations of the Commission to consider such rights has been read into
the act by Pattie v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n., 402 P.2d 596 (Mont.
1965), 23 0. & G.R. 65 (1965). See, infra note 50 and accompanying text.
9. Driscoll, Secondary Recovery of Oil and Gas: Significance of Agency Approval, 13 KAN. L. REV. 481, 483 (1965).
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LIABILITY OF INJECTOR TO NON-JOINER

Before directly discussing the prospect of a unit operator's liability and the remedies available to the non-assenting
interest owner, it is imperative to dispose of certain collateral
issues that might otherwise cloud the analysis.
As it is well known that there are several theories of
ownership concerning the nature of the landowner's interest
in the oil and gas underlying his land,10 the 'development of
these theories will not be treated here. However, mention
should be made of the effect of these several theories of ownership on actions by non-assenting landowners. Generally,
the liability vel non of the injecting party to the adjoining,
non-unitized owner does not appear to turn on the view held
in the particular state as to the nature of the landowner's
interest in the oil and gas underlying his land." Specifically,
it appears that the view held in the state has neither significance in determining whether one landowner is liable to
others overlying the common reservoir for conduct resulting
in the permanent loss of otherwise recoverable hydrocarbons
nor importance in determining whether one landowner is liable to others for injury to the producing formation." Instead,
the law of capture as modified by the doctrine of correlative
rights is the hub of the wheel around which secondary recovery projects turn. Discussion of this facet of oil and gas law
m
is deferred until later where it will be fully treated."
From the cases that immediately follow, there is said
to be a developing body of law today to the effect that reasonable injection programs directed toward increased secondary recovery and pressure maintenance will not be enjoined at the urging of non-consenters in unitized areas or
owners of competing leaseholds in non-unitized areas. Under
the present decisions, 4 no injunctive relief would issue simply
because the injection program threatens to flood out the
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.5 (1964).

Id. at § 204.7; Franks, supra note 6, at 381.
Franks, supra note 6, at 368.
See, infra note 50 and accompanying text.
In addition to the cases mentioned in text, see also, Barnwell Drilling Co.,
v. Sun Oil Co., 300 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962); Syverson v. North Dakota
State Indus. Comm'n., 111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1961), 15 0. & G.R. 478 (1961) ;
Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1961).
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producing property of the complaining party where the program was approved by the lawful order of the regulatory
agency and where the project operator has conducted the
project in conformity with such order."0 The first case to
be considered in this respect is Reed v. Texas Co."0 in which,
by reliance on a previous Illinois decision sustaining a lessee's
injection program even though oil was driven from beneath
the complaining party's acreage," injunctive relief was denied
to interest owners. The evidence showed the project had resulted in a sharing pattern essentially similar to that under
primary recovery and ultimate recovery from the reservoir
would be significantly increased. In the more recent case of
Railroad Comm'n. v. Manziel,'8 plaintiffs sued to set aside
an order of the state regulatory agency permitting defendants
to inject water into the latter's well which was located adjacent to plaintiffs' property. In dissolving the injunction
earlier issued by the district court, the Texas Supreme Court
stressed the social value of secondary recovery operations.
Thus, it is apparent that the equitable remedy of injunction
will be unavailable to the adjacent, non-unitized landowner
where the unit operator has complied with the lawful order
of the conservation agency, where the non-joiner finds the
effect of the injection has been to enhance rather than curtail
his recovery, and where the social value of the unit operation
is recognized as closely tied with the public interest.
Voluntary Unitization"0
It has been uniformly held that, absent enabling legislation, courts may not force a non-unitized party to join a
voluntary secondary project." In considering whether the
non-joiner has any remedy for the injury sustained by virtue
of the program instituted under an order approved by the
state conservation agency, the problem is reduced, as one
Franks, supra note 6, at 386.
22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 159 N.E.2d 641 (1959), 11 0. & G.R. 789 (1959).
Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950).
361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962), 17 0. & G.R. 444 (1963).
States in which voluntary unitization legislation has been enacted include:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Compiled at 6 WiUwAms
& MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 913.1 (1964).
20. Franks, eupra note 6, at 386.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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observer has noted, to the question whether the administrative
authorization casts a cloak of protection around the injecting
party and denies the adjacent owner a remedy. 1 The case
of Corzelius v. Railroad Comm'n.22 used the following language, which has been quoted in support of the "cloak of
protection" theory: "[B] eing authorized by law such entry
did not constitute a trespass." 2 It has been said this case
should be cited as authority for the sole proposition that in
periods of emergency the police power of the state can be
summoned to accomplish almost any needed result.' The
authorized entry with which the case was concerned consisted of injection of substances into the underlying formation in order to kill a well in which fire had developed. This
was the emergency which necessitated the exercise of the
police power.
Notwithstanding the "cloak of protection" theory and
the developing body of law with regard to the unavailability
of injunctive relief, one reporter points out that there is an
underlying area of weakness in these decisions." He observes
that the opinions depended on records establishing that the
interests of the complaining parties did not suffer by reason
of the injection programs in issue. For this reason two
cases may be significant. In King v. Columbian Carbon Co."
the Fifth Circuit stated: "As a concession to industrial progress and social utility the law will not abate a useful and
lawful enterprise even though it be a nuisance, but further
,," (Emphasis added).
than that the law does not recede .
v. North Dakota
of
Syverson
case
recent
more
the
in
Again
2
State Indus. Comm'n., which involved a voluntary unit
situation in which a non-signing owner sought to overturn
on appeal an agency order authorizing a pressure maintenance program, the state court concluded:
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Kelley, Trespass in Secondary Recovery, 17 Sw. L.J. 591, 593 (1963).
182 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
Id. at 417.
Kelley, supra note 21, at 594.
Discussion notes, 17 0. & G.R. 462 (1963).
152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945).

27. Id. at 641-642.
28. Syverson v. North Dakota State Indus. Comm'n., 111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D.
1961), 15 0. & G.R.478 (1961).
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By refusing to join such agreement ... appellants
may not, at the same time, prevent other interests
in the field from developing adjoining tracts under
such agreement .. . . Whatever the result would be
if the appellants could show actual damages, they
certainly are not entitled to complain in absence of
such showing.2 9 (Emphasis added)
While not directly stated, the language of these two cases
strongly implies that even if an injection program tailored to
prevent waste and promote industrial and social progress will
not be enjoined since public policy considerations override the
private interests, the affected non-unitized landowners will
be relegated to an action at law for damages if such can
be shown."0
Legal Remedies. The mention of possible access to an
action at law for damages provides an appropriate vehicle
with which to move the discussion into the realm of legal
remedies. The damage remedy can be broadly categorized
into two groups, the first of which consists of cases and
authoritative pronouncements holding that the injecting operator is or should be immune from liability, and the second
of which consists of cases, a state statute, and authoritative
pronouncements claiming that the operator is liable for trespass, negligence, nuisance, or absolutely for any damages
proximately caused. It is offered that regardless of these
theories, the true liability attaches because of the injury to
the correlative rights of the adjacent, non-unitized landowner.
Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Stott8 is the first of
two cases to be considered which have refused to recognize
any liability and, consequently, have refused to award any
damages. In Stott, the repressuring of a gas field was undertaken by the operator after a voluntary agreement to unitize
the field for that purpose had been stipulated by all parties
concerned except the plaintiffs. The operator commenced
injection of dry gas to repressure the wet gas field, the nonjoining plaintiffs complaining that this recycling would even29. Id. 111 N.W.2d at 134.
30. Discussion notes, 17 0. & G.R. 462, 463 (1963).
31. 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 817 (1947).
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tually drain off their more valuable wet gas and replace it
with dry gas to their financial loss. In denying the plaintiffs'
petition, the Fifth Circuit stated:
In short, the [plaintiffs] may not refuse to cooperate
with their lessees for their mutual protection in the
adoption of the practicable customary method or plan
universal in the [field] offered them by the [defendants] and at the same time assert and demand damages .... Any damages which they suffer is damnum
absque injuria and in nowise are such damages
chargeable to [defendants] .8 (Emphasis added)

In the subsequent case of California Co. v. Britt,.. the great
majority of lessors had joined a voluntary repressuring unit
arranged by a lessee who had received agency approval for
the plan, the plaintiffs declining to participate. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that a non-assenting lessor had no
standing to bring a damage action for drainage. The results
in these two cases appear to turn in part on the fact that
plaintiffs refused a fair opportunity to join in a fair plan
of unitization. 4 Likewise, the results of these decisions lend
authoritative support for what has been called a "negative
rule of capture," to the effect that:
Just as under the rule of capture, a landowner may
capture such oil or gas as will migrate from adjoining
premises to a well bottomed on his own land, so also
may he inject into a formation substances which may
migrate through the structure to the land of others,
even if this results in the displacement under such
land of more valuable with less valuable substances
(e.g., displacement of wet gas with dry gas) .... 35
Under this negative rule of capture, plaintiff's only remedy
would be a water flood program of his own. Yet, if the size
of the individual's tract is such that it would not be economically feasible to instigate necessary secondary recovery
operations sua sponte and if he refuses to join in with adjacent owners in their program, he would have no remedy.
But the proponents of this negative rule do not propose that
32. Id. 159 F.2d at 179.
33. 247 Miss. 718, 154 So. 2d 144 (1963), 19 0. & G.R. 36 (1963).
34. Williams, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization (Of Oil and Gas Rights),
15th OIL & GAS INST. 223, 265 (Sw. LWGAL FDN. 1964).
35. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 53-54.
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the injecting party have an absolute right to inject without
liability. They continue:
The law on this subject has not as yet been fully
developed, but it seems reasonable ...

that such ac-

tivity will be permitted, free of any claim for damages, only if pursued as a part of a reasonable program of development and without injury to producing
or potentially producing formations.8" (Emphasis
added)
However, this conclusion neither provides any concrete suggestion as to what law is to be applied to an action for injury
to the formation nor does it mention the problem of an action
for production lost, beyond the intimation that contemporary
authority does not support such actionability.8 s
The authoritative pronouncements that an operator injecting fluids in conformity with an approved plan should be
immunized from consequential damage claims"8 proceed from
the proposition that the police power of the state extends
to the area of conservation of natural resources and that,
therefore, the execution of a state approved plan to accomplish this socially valuable and publicly oriented enterprise
should not result in the operator's liability. Yet, there is
an essential distinction to be made. While agency-ordered
restrictions on primary production, necessary to prevent
waste and preserve the fruits of one's industry in producing
from a common source of supply are uncompensable, it seems
anomolous to immunize a private person from liability on
the basis of compliance with a state approved plan." It is
conceded that, even though wells are flooded out, there should
be no basis for damages where the effect of injection will
be to enhance the recoveries of the affected property owners
over what would have been obtained absent the beneficial
influence of artificial repressuring conferred at no expense
to them.4 It is offered, however, that where some damage
86. Id. at 54.
37. Id. at 53.
38. Hughes, Legal Problems of Water Flooding, Recycling, and Other Secondary
Operations, 9th OIL & GAS INST. 105, 135 (Sw. LEGAL FDN. 1958).
39. Discussion notes, supra note 30, at 464.
40. Kelley, supra note 21, at 591. The California statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 731 (c), provides that any benefit from secondary recovery operations will
be considered in mitigation of damages.
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to potential recoveries may be inevitable, the injecting operator should decide whether the benefits accrued sufficiently
exceed the potential damage liability to justify the project;
in other words, the operator must assume the economists'
cost-benefit approach4 1 for it is an inescapable fact that in
secondary recovery damage cases there is actual physical
invasion which is the proximate cause of the injury and which
forms the basis of a cause of action.
Attention is now directed to the second group of damage
remedy and representative cases espousing various theories
of liability. The first case to be mentioned is West Edmond
4 2 in which the plaintiff brought
Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard
an action in trespass because his producing well had been
flooded out by the defendant's injected salt water. Plaintiff
claimed and recovered in full the value of oil well casing lost
and extraordinary expenses incurred in attempting to retrieve
the casing. Representative of the negligence theory is a California state statute which provides that there is no liability
on the part of the injecting party in a unitized field in the
absence of proof of negligence.4 3 No other state appears to
make such provision. Coinciding with this theory of liability, however, is the proposal of one writer to adapt to subsurface activity the analysis that in surface activities there
should be a separate consideration of intentional and unintentional acts in determining a basis of liability for injury
to another's property. He suggests a negligence theory for
unintentional invasions and a nuisance theory for the intentional intrusions:
41. Discussion notes, supra note 30, at 464-465. The "cost-benefit formula"
indicates that a project is desirable if the ratio of benefits to costs is
favorable. If two competing interests want the same resource for inconsistent purposes, the cost-benefit ratio can be used to determine the one
that promises the greater benefits and comes closest to the development
and regulation of the resource so as to get the maximum benefit from it
in the public interest, hence the one that should be granted the resource
use. In computing a given party's cost, consideration must be accorded the
compensation paid the other party for the foregone benefits of his project.
42. 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
43. CAL. Pus. REsouRCES CODE § 3320.5:
No working or royalty interest owner shall be liable for any loss
or damage resulting from repressuring or other operations connected with the production of oil and gas which are conducted,
without negligence, pursuant to and in accordance with a co-operative or unit agreement ordered or approved by the Supervisor pursuant to this article.
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[I] f the secondary recovery operator unintentionally
causes invasions of neighboring lands that result
in physical damage to non-unitized property, liability
should follow only if the [unit operator] was negligent in his conduct . . . . Such cases would arise
where the [injector] is under the impression ...that

his flooding [substance] will not extend beyond his
own unit. On the other hand, if the secondary operation is carried out in a reservoir known to be common
to both joiners and non-joiners in the program, the
intrusions into the stratum of the non-joiners should
in most cases be considered intentional. Even though
the operator may intend invasion but not harm, his
subjective intent should not control. If there is a
substantial certainty that all wells in the reservoir
will eventually be flooded . . . the damage as well
as the invasion must be said to be intentional. . .."

Next in point and illustrative of the theory of absolute liability is the case of Gulf Oil Co. v. Hughes." In holding that
the theory of strict liability applied to a water flood operator
whose salt water had migrated and flooded the plaintiff's
fresh water well, the Oklahoma Supreme Court relied largely
on an Oklahoma state constitutional provision relating to the
taking of private property without compensation." The
court believed that such pollution constituted a private nuisance. However, it seems unreasonable to apply such strict
liability where the damaging of property is a reduction in
the amount of oil ultimately recoverable by another mineral
owner from a common source of supply. "When the 'injury'
or 'damage' is an increase in the amount of oil recovered at
the expense of a neighbor, it is necessary to [consider] the
owning
law of capture and the correlative rights of owners
47
mineral rights in a common source of supply.'

These cases and their consequent theories of liability
notwithstanding, the most significant and most recent secondary recovery damage case is that of Tidewater Oil Co. v.
Jackson."' Simplified, the facts present a familiar situation.
44. Methvin, Secondary Recovery Operations: Rights of the Non-Joiner, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 364, 374 (1964).
45. 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962), 16 0. & G.R. 1016 (1962).
46. Id. 371 P.2d at 83.
47. Discussion notes, 18 0. & G.R. 1048, 1049 (1963).
48. Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, supra note 1.
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Tidewater notified Jackson of its intention to water flood
its properties adjacent to Jackson and proposed a cooperative project. Jackson declined to join since his wells were
still producing in paying quantities. Tidewater commenced
drilling input wells very close to Jackson's producing wells
with the result that the latter were flooded out. In holding
that the water flooding activities were intentional, the consequences foreseeable, and therefore actionable if they caused
substantial injury, even though lawfully carried on, the
Tenth Circuit used the following language: "[N]o man's
property can be taken, directly or indirectly, without compensation . . . . Even the sovereign must pay for what it
takes or damages for the public good, and it cannot absolve
a private party from the same duty."" From a perusal of
the key words of the opinion, it is seen that the peg on which
the court hangs its hat is not one of the traditional theories
of tort liability, e.g., trespass, negligence, or nuisance. Instead, the court says that lawfully conducted secondary operations with foreseeable consequences are actionable if substantial injury occurs. In other words, the decision seems
to rest on a well-known principle, viz., if an operator effectuates such a program and in so doing injures his neighbor,
the protection of correlative rights demands that the nonunitized landowner be idemnified for his loss.
The point to be made is that while, under the law of
capture, a unit operator has the right to extract oil and gas
from the common source of supply without accounting to the
non-joining owner for a share of the production, such right
must be exercised with due regard for the similar rights of
that non-joiner to extract minerals from the same source
of supply." In this context, correlative rights means protection against spoilage of the common source of supply
(e.g., by flooding) and the right to a fair share of the underlying oil or gas.51 This right to a fair share does not assure
a proportionate share of the minerals; it simply means that
he has a right to a fair opportunity to extract oil and gas."
49. Id. 320 F.2d at 163.
50. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.7 (1962).

51. Id. at §§ 4.1. 4.3.
52. See generally, KUNTZ, op. it. supra note 50, at §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.7.
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It must be realized, too, that this is not a special correlative
rights doctrine which sounds the death knell to the law of
capture. On the contrary, the doctrine is complementary.
In this matter of conservation measures, the fair division
of production from the common source of supply necessarily
involves consideration of the benefits that could have been
realized under the operation of the law of capture. If consideration is given to such factors as porosity and permeability
of the sands, the volume of the substance, location on the
structure, and acre feet of sands, then production is being
divided on such basis. In other words, the law of capture
is being employed as a point of reference."
That this common law of correlative rights looms large
in this field of oil and gas law is evidenced by the recent case
of Pattie v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n." Involved was
a landowner adjacent to plaintiff who drilled for oil in accordance with established well-spacing rules. The completed
well, only 330 feet west from the subdivision line, was a gas
well and thus violated a spacing rule that such wells be located at least 1320 feet from a property line. The driller
requested an exception. Plaintiff also requested an exception
so as to permit him to offset the well in this new gas field by
drilling 330 feet east of the common property line. In granting the driller's request but denying plaintiff's, the Commission considered evidence showing that plaintiff would be
outside the field if he had to drill on the regular spacing
pattern instead of the excepted one. The trial court held
plaintiff entitled to his share of the gas or compensation for
that amount. In affirming, the Montana Supreme Court
said that even though the state statute made no mention of
correlative rights," the interests of adjacent landowners in
sharing in a common source of supply required such consideration; otherwise, "the legislation would have to be held
unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due
process of law . . "",- Similarly, a noted authority on oil
and gas law has said: "When the right to produce oil or gas
53.
64.
55.
56.

Id. at § 4.1.
402 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1965), 23 0. & G.R. 65 (1965).
Ibid.
1d. 402 P.2d at 699.
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is denied or curtailed by conservation regulation, measures
must be taken to assure owners equal opportunity to enjoy
their fair share of production, and a denial of such equal
opportunity would amount to confiscation ....
',57

With the mention of "confiscation," it must be concluded
that a serious due process question is presented if the state
attempts to immunize an individual who has damaged another.
Indeed, "Precise location of the limit on the power of the
state to permit invasion without compensation may be circumvented if the state provides a remedy in damages.""8
It has always been recognized that under the police power
the regulation of the use and enjoyment of the private property taken must be reasonable." The legislature cannot, under
the guise of that power, impose unreasonable and arbitrary
rules and regulations which go beyond that power and, in
effect, deprive a person of his property within the purview
of the law of eminent domain." The problem of the statecondoned interference with correlative rights under secondary
recovery operations actually appears to fall into a twilight
zone somewhere between the exercise of the police power and
the law of eminent domain. As a general rule, the police
power does not appropriate the property taken to another
use, but destroys it completely; eminent domain, on the other
hand, takes property from the owner and transfers it to a
public agency to be enjoyed by the latter as its own."' The
distinguishing features between these two legal processes are
that eminent domain compensates for what is taken, while
the police power does not; and that the police power completely destroys the property taken, while eminent domain
transfers it to a public agency. Even though the authorization
order given by the state conservation agency in secondary
recovery cases 'does not, in theory, appropriate the taken property for its own use, it seems the order does effectuate this
KUNTZ, op. cit. supra note 50, § 4.7 at 102.
58. Kelley, supra note 21, at 599-600.
59. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965).
60. Ibid. As one writer points out, the practical reality of an approved injection
program is that the state approval obtained is based on rather cursory
examination even though presumed commission expertise and application
of the substantial evidence rule on review makes the approval impregnable
in law. Discussion notes, 17 0. & G.R. 462 (1963).
61. 29A C.J.S., supra note 59.

57.
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result in practice. And since the protection of correlative
rights demands reparation when such rights are taken, it
is submitted that the authority behind the state agency order
approaches more nearly an exercise of the law of eminent
domain than an exercise of the police power.
Along this same line of reasoning, note the observations
of two authorities in the field of oil and gas law. One has
stated:
At some point the police power becomes so strained
that its further application requires a compensatory
element for the taking of private property even
though the public welfare is served by the taking
.... It is not unreasonable that, for the oil and gas
field of law, affirmative plans designed to enhance
ultimate recovery also should be the point at which
the possibility of compensation in terms of an action
for damages against the operator should enter the
picture to justify this further extension of the police
power."'
Concluding that the Tidewater case is an example of an instance where the exercise of the police power has reached the
breaking point at which further application required a compensatory element for the taking of private property even
though the public welfare was served by such taking, one
other authority said:
Although the action is described in terms of tort,
the result is within the spirit of the principles of
eminent domain which compel the sovereign or its
designees to afford compensation to those whose
property is taken in furtherance of enterprises held
to be in the public good."3
Damages. With this development of the compensatory
element being made, it is necessary to turn consideration
toward a method of measuring the damages to which the
injured landowner is entitled. For the invasion to oil and
gas property which results in substantial injury, the proper
measure of damages may be the decrease in market value of
the property invaded, measured first before the invasion oc62.
63.

Discussion notes, 17 0. & G.R. 462, 464 (1963).
Discussion notes, 18 0. & G.R. 993, 994 (1963).
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curred and second from past losses and projected future
losses." ' The precise computation of these damages appears
to be as follows. Before the invading substances were injected
into the ground, there existed X barrels of ultimately recoverable oil which the non-unitized owner had the right to
capture. At the time of the trial there existed Y barrels of
ultimately recoverable oil, including that oil produced in the
interim between injection and the trial. If X exceeds Y,
the non-unitized owner has suffered 'damage and should recover the value of the oil lost. In addition, he should recover
for the cost of drilling any new wells necessary to give him
the well capacity needed to restore productive capacity. If
Y equals or exceeds X plus necessary well costs, the nonunitized owner should not recover, i.e., if he has suffered no
monetary loss even after considering the loss of needed well
capacity, the invasion is damnun absque injwria. In this

computation certain explanations are necessary. First, the
unit operator should be allowed an offset for the migration
of any oil across the boundary. Second, the unknowns X
and Y should be stated in terms of discounted value of the
oil in the reservoir according to contemporaneous production
allowables. Third, in determining the ultimately recoverable
oil which the non-unitized owner had the right to capture,
consideration must be given production allowables since the
amount capable of production depends on the rate of production to some extent. Finally, the measure of the value
of the oil lost should be gauged by the market value of the
oil at the time of the invasion. 5
Compulsory Unitization66
Heretofore, the discussion has considered only the voluntary unit agreement. Attention now focuses on compulsory
unitization, an area seldom tread by the steps of litigation.
While the non-signing interest owner cannot be forced by
64. Kelley, supra note 21, at 600.
65. Id. at 600-601 & nf. 77-82. The foregoing text material is a liberal paraphrase of Kelley's treatment of damages.
66. Compulsory unitization legislation has been enacted in the following states:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington. Compiled at 6 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 972 (1964).
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law to join and participate in unitization of a common source
of supply by virtue of voluntary agreement and, therefore,
may be compensated if his interests are adversely affected;
the effect of the compulsory order may be to force the nonsigning owner to join and participate. But it should not
necessarily follow that the forced party cannot be compensated
if his interests in the common source of supply are adversely
affected by the order. The primary problem in this area,
then, would seem to arise when the non-assenter is compelled
to join the unit program for purposes of secondary recovery
and he is, in fact, still engaged in primary production. In
such case, is the forced party to be compensated for his loss
of primary production ? If so, or if not, what is a reasonable
participation formula for all parties concerned so that benefits and costs will be equally shared and correlative rights in
the common source of supply protected ?
It has been suggested that the possibility of a damage
suit such as Tidewater would not be present if compulsory
unitization were introduced for the purpose of conducting
secondary recovery projects.6 7 This belief is based on the
assumption that all parties who could be adversely affected
by fluid migration would be sharing the benefits of the operation, e.g., development and operation of the unit area as one
continuous reservoir, placement of input and production wells
without regard to surface lines of separately owned properties so the wells may best serve the reservoir, protective aspect
of the conservation order, and, with regard to correlative
rights, the recoverable oil and gas is now the property of all
with production and sharing on an equitable and approved
basis. 8 It is offered that this basic assumption fails to take
into account the questions posed at the outset relating to
loss of primary production and reasonable participation
formula as to which the factors of porosity and permeability
of sand, acre feet of sand, and location on the structure must
be considered.
67. Driscoll, supra note 9, at 495; Bowen, Secondary Recovery Operations-Their Value and Their Legal Problems, 13th OIL & GAS INST. 331, 337-38
(Sw. LEGAL FDN. 1962).
68. Ibid. See also, Franks, supra note 6, at 384-85.
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Any search for case law having a fact situation wherein
the forced party is still engaged in profitable primary production and all other unit members are ready to initiate
secondary recovery measures appears to be in vain; however,
the recent case of Jones Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n. 9
is somewhat similar and will, therefore, be mentioned for any
light it may shed on the problem. For purposes of this treatment the caveat must be stated that any final determination
of the problem within the confines of this paper is little
more than an educated guess.
In the Jones case, the field had been unitized by compulsory order, but a time period remained before secondary
recovery commenced, during which primary production was
to be carried on by all interest owners. A "split formula" of
participation was to be followed to the effect that a separately
owned tract's participation in primary unit production was
a percentage derived by dividing the individual tract's cumulative production for a designated base period" by the unit
area cumulative production for the same period. Upon termination of this primary period, the estimated total future
primary oil was to have been recovered. Thereafter, secondary
recovery operations were to be commenced, based on the
second aspect of the "split formula" which would allocate
unit production among and to the separately owned tracts on
the basis of net acre feet of productive sand under each tract.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the unitization order
and the "split formula" of participation, thereby rejecting
the plaintiff's contention that they were not receiving and
would not receive their fair and reasonable share under such
a plan.
By analogy with the Jones decision, the dilemma in which
the forced party still engaged in primary production finds
himself in relation to other unit members who are ready to
commence secondary recovery operations seems to resolve
itself in favor of the forced party. If the participation formula for primary production would allocate to the forced
69. 382 P.2d 751 (Okla. 1963), 18 0. & G.R. 1041 (1963).
70. In the instant case, the base period was July 1, 1959 through December 31,

1959.
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party a percentage of total unit production, it may not violate
his correlative rights nor such rights of the unit members.
This would seem to hold true if the forced party's percentage
was derived by dividing his tract's cumulative production for
a base period-at the end of which his estimated total future
primary production will have been realized-by the unit area
cumulative production for the same period. By this arrangement the forced party, in effect, is being completely left alone
by the unit to recover his primary production and the unit
members are still able to recover from unit area cumulative
production. Upon termination of his primary recovery, the
forced party could then participate with the unit members
according to the participation formula instituted for the
secondary operations.
In connection with this participation formula as it
relates to secondary recovery, there arises the difficult question of liability for oil drained by such operations when there
is neither reduction in primary recovery nor the ultimate
secondary recovery by all owners from the common source
of supply. As one authority stated:
If the answer . . . is that there is liability on the
part of the water flood operator, then any participation formula must necessarily be upon the basis of
volume of oil in place, without regard to the factor
of location on structure or other factors which would
control the volume of oil which any operator could
expect to recover under the law of capture."1
But this authority does not see this as a repudiation of the
law of capture or the recognition of absolute ownership in
place; rather, it is the operation of the doctrine of correlative
rights in its complementary clothing. Of this, Kuntz says:
Perhaps the conclusion to be reached is that each
owner is entitled to a fair opportunity to extract oil
recoverable by primary production methods without
interference by secondary recovery operations engaged in by others. With regard to secondary recovery, however, the right is not a right to oil in
place, but is a right to a fair opportunity to engage
in secondary recovery operations7 2
71. Discussion notes, 18 0. & G.R. 1048, 1050 (1963).

72. Ibid.
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Further, he concludes:
[A] participation formula which allocates the secondary production on an acre feet of sand basis will be
approved .. unless it can be clearly demonstrated
that it is unreasonable and deprives the protestant
of his property without due process by awarding him
a smaller portion of production than he would have
been able to obtain by individual operation.7"
CONCLUSION

State-approved conservation programs instituted under
the guise of the police power involve striking a balance between the protection of a non-joining landowner's correlative
rights in the oil and gas underlying his land and the preservation of a unit operator's fruits of industry in producing
from a common source of supply. Where the unit operations
adversely affect the non-joiner's correlative rights, equitable
relief will not provide protection to the latter. In turning
toward legal relief, the non-joiner finds no solace in an ownership theory because the minerals involved are found in a
common source of supply; hence, unit operators as well as

non-joiners have the undeniable right to extract minerals
therefrom. But this law of capture is modified by the doctrine of correlative rights, and therein the injured non-joiner
finds his protection. For the operator who submits a plan
of unitization and for the agency that approves it, it is recommended that both of them take notice of the fact that secondary recovery operations usually result in the flooding of the
entire reservoir. Using this as a guideline, both the operator
and the agency should use the cost-benefit formula to decide
whether or not the project deserves approval. In other words,
all that is needed is for the operator and the agency to understand an economic principle. This is, that in 'developing
natural resources the goal is to provide the maximum net
benefits, and that in counting costs against those benefits,
the agency and the unit operator should include losses and
induced adverse effects. This means that if a conservation
program deprives a non-unitized landowner of the resource
use, the loss of such use is a cost of the conservation program.
73.

Ibid.
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In the final analysis, the only issue is who should bear the
loss and pay the cost. Should it be paid by the unit operator
and borne by all those who receive the benefits of the conservation program, or should the non-unitized landowner be
required to make a costly sacrifice for the public good ? The
answer to this question has not been clearly settled, but it
must be said when considering such answer that the compensation principle is needed, not because it sets private interests above public interests, but because it is in the public
interest and is in accord with the policies of conservation
legislation. If such reparation is refused on the basis of the
argument that the program was authorized under a valid
exercise of the police power, the refusal will be to no avail.
Such taking or damaging of private property in the interests
of conservation approaches more nearly the spirit of the
principles of the law of eminent domain under which compensation must be paid.
With regard to the situation of the forced party in a
compulsory program, it appears to be on a common ground
with that of the non-joiner under voluntary unitization. Protection of the forced party's correlative rights demands that
he be given a fair opportunity to complete his primary production or be compensated therefore, and further, that he be
accorded a fair opportunity to participate in secondary recovery operations. In these operations the criteria to be
followed should include, at least, porosity and permeability
of the sands. This is not a denial of the law of capture, but
is a recognition of such law as modified by the doctrine of
correlative rights.
THOMAS M. GOLDEN
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